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Introduction  
In a 2019 collection, Deirdre Nansen McCloskey, co-founder of 
POROI and Distinguished Professor Emerita at The University of 
Illinois at Chicago, contributed an essay entitled “Free Speech, 
Rhetoric, and a Free Economy.”1 Her claim was that rhetoric and 
liberty are doubly linked. For one thing, any defense of liberty will 
make use of rhetoric, “rhetoric” understood as “speaking with 
persuasive intent instead of using physical violence.” For another, 
the free market in ideas is a rhetorical idea at the heart of free 
societies. The evidence for the second proposition—that liberty is 
rhetorical, a matter of sweet talk, is not so persuasive as that 
defenses of liberty are themselves rhetorical. If true, however, the 
proposition that liberty is rhetorical is more important. The growth 
of knowledge may justify a constitution of liberty, as the economist 
and philosopher Friedrich Hayek believed, but rhetoric gives 
persuasive tongue to both liberty and knowledge. Free speech is 
more than merely parallel to free exchange. The liberal society is 
one that gets its rhetoric straight. The present text is a colloquium 
between McCloskey and eight interlocutors, and some of them with 
each other. It was originally conducted on a Facebook group 
devoted to the study of the book The Dialectics of Liberty over six 
days. Many participated, but eight engaged more fully.    
Poroi: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Rhetorical Analysis and 
Invention is proud to present this colloquium as part of the 45th 
Anniversary of the founding of The Project on the Rhetoric of 
Inquiry at the University of Iowa. The participants are Winton 
Bates (independent scholar, Australia), Elizabeth Bissell (music 
instructor, Antioch, TN), Roger E. Bissell (research associate, 
Molinari Institute), Troy Camplin (Ph.D. Humanities, consultant, 
Camplin Creative Consulting), Philippe Chamy 
(interpreter/translator), Roderick Tracy Long (Ph.D. Philosophy, 
Auburn University, Auburn, AL), Kent Rainey Biler (student of 
Philosophy and Economics, University of Nebraska, Omaha, NE), 
Jason Walker (Philosophy, University of South Florida, St. 
Petersburg, FL), and Deirdre Nansen McCloskey (University of 
Illinois, emerita, Chicago, IL). The colloquium was organized by 
Chris Matthew Sciabarra (Ph.D., NYU, Politics, Brooklyn, NY).  
 
1 The argument was anticipated in McCloskey (1996).  
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Day 1 
Philippe Chamy: Splendid reading! 
McCloskey: J'admire beaucoup votre jugement ! 
Roderick Tracy Long: I do have a quarrel with what McCloskey's 
chapter says about Plato's Gorgias, one of my favorite Platonic 
dialogues. One of the aims of that dialogue is to distinguish between 
two modes of speech – one that aims at truth and one that aims at 
power. Plato identifies the former with philosophy and the latter 
with rhetoric, thus drawing McCloskey's ire because she is a 
longtime defender of the importance of rhetoric.  
McCloskey: Yes, Plato is charming, and Gorgias most of all. 
But we must not, I am sure you agree, love his eloquence so 
much that we fall for his authoritarian tastes, the tastes of an 
aristocrat hostile to democracy. I do defend rhetoric, and long 
have. My reasons are two: (1) It is the basis of a free society, as 
its inventors in Sicily understood, and, as the essay argues, (2) 
There is no “dialectic” that can yield Truth, capital T, only an 
honest rhetorical discourse getting agreed truth for the nonce. 
Both of these reasons are assaulted by Plato, everywhere in 
the writings we have.  
Roderick Tracy Long: But in her critique of Gorgias she says 
that Plato is defending a state-imposed standard of truth. I don't 
see that in Gorgias at all. Maybe she is reading the Republic back 
into Gorgias.  
McCloskey: Hmm. I suppose I am. 
Roderick Tracy Long: But if so, that strikes me as a mistake. 
Plato's thought evolved over time, and not always for the better. But 
I see nothing in Gorgias that's favorable to state power; on the 
contrary, it seems to me to be one of the most magnificently anti-
power things that Plato ever wrote. 
McCloskey: Yes, perhaps I am allowing my distaste for the 
politics of his later writings (admitting that we don’t really 
know the sequence of the writings) to color my understanding 
of the earlier ones. Yet the anti-power arguments, which I 
agree are magnificent, are interspersed with anti-rhetoric 
arguments, too, as though both, power and rhetoric, were the 
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same. He believes, and many of us do too, footnotes to Plato 
that we are, that there’s a Third Thing, not power and not 
“mere” rhetoric, but Proof. True, the Proof is not, in Gorgias, 
conceived as imposed by the state. Later it is. Banish the 
poets. 
Philippe Chamy: Perhaps the "state-imposed" standard of truth 
might have been directed more at what is going on today. I find it 
highly pertinent in light of our current “fake news” hysteria. 
McCloskey: Yes, and not “merely” rhetorical in China, 
Russia, Turkey, Hungary, and then the usual suspects such as 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and on and on.  
Troy Camplin: Aristotle argued that strong rhetoric requires you 
to demonstrate logos, ethos, and pathos. What this implies is that if 
you are going to learn rhetoric, you have to learn not only to be 
logical/rational, but also to be ethical and to have empathy. This 
means a liberal education, rooted in teaching grammar, logic, and 
rhetoric, requires an education in ethics and empathy. 
McCloskey: Yes. In Cato the Elder’s phrase (Quintilian 
quotes it), the rhetor is “vir bonus dicendi peritus,” the good 
man (and woman, dear: mulier as much as vir!) skilled at 
speaking. The trick then is to give content to “good.” Plato, 
believing that there is a Good out there discoverable by your 
and Aristotle’s logic, reckoned that no extra work on being 
good was necessary. Such was denied by later ethical thinkers 
of the classical, and modern, world: We call it “virtue ethics” 
these days. 
Troy Camplin: Now ethics and empathy are hardly the same 
thing, as there are two sides of empathy, one of which can cause us 
to engage in very unethical actions.  
McCloskey: Sure. One sort of unethical person is like Donald 
Trump, whose organ of empathy is broken. But an empathetic 
person—empathetic, for example, for the poor Hungarian 
nation, assaulted by Jews and Muslims, can be entirely 
lacking in ethical character. I would go beyond “engage in 
unethical actions” and recommend instead (as in The 
bourgeois virtues, 2006) that same ancient, and very modern, 
virtue ethics: develop a good character (bonus) and then act 
naturally. Action by action doesn’t work. Context always 
matters. Thus, the Trolley Problem. 
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Troy Camplin: And we know that literature increases empathy in 
adults and in children in part by improving theory of mind.  
McCloskey: Well, not always. It depends on context. To take 
an admittedly extreme one, a startlingly high percentage of 
officers in the SS had advanced degrees in the humanities 
Troy Camplin: Indeed, as Aristotle pointed out, fiction/myth is 
more philosophical/ethical than nonfiction/history precisely 
because the latter only tell us how things are, while the former tell 
us how things could and ought to be. And when nonfiction 
storytellers try to moralize, it actually backfires—or, more 
accurately, it emphasizes the negative aspects of empathy. And yes, 
empathy does have a few negative aspects. For one, it can reduce 
utilitarian judgment.  
McCloskey: I suppose so, but I would not make utilitarian 
judgments into an all-purpose ethical test, as I suppose you 
would not either. The “reduction” might be a good thing. 
Troy Camplin: For another, strong empathy for your in-group 
means increased hatred for the out-group. Empathy feeds tribalism, 
while ethics and justice undermine it.  
McCloskey: Yes, as I noted above. 
Troy Camplin: Thus, an education in ethics undermines the 
negative aspects of empathy, and an education in literature 
increases the positive aspects of empathy, extending it to the Other 
(thus making us more moral). 
McCloskey: I do not think reading Ulysses is an ethical 
education, and I’m not at all sure that even Shakespeare is. 
But I would go along with your argument if aligned with 
Wayne Booth’s notion of ethical and unethical books. Willa 
Cather is an ethical education. 
Troy Camplin: One can argue that empathy is a part of the moral 
order, but it's a mixed bag portion that has to be balanced out by 
other moral considerations. But both empathy and morality are 
important to develop in no small part because they help us live with 
others, and they help to moderate other social orders. Of course, 
pathos is more than just empathy. It also involves emotions. 
Meaning, a liberal education needs to educate people in their 
emotions as well. This is where an education in music and poetry 
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comes in. Indeed, music is one of the liberal arts, an education in 
modes and, later, in harmony, though found in the Quadrivium 
rather than the Trivium, medievally speaking. But here we can see 
where they overlap and reinforce each other. And poetry 
contributes further by bridging music and the literary arts. 
McCloskey: Now that is certainly true. I hope you have read 
Adam Smith’s The theory of moral sentiment, which like the 
philosophers of the ancient Mediterranean, except Plato, 
speaks at length about ethical education, and the formation of 
a good character.  
Troy Camplin: We can see then how deeply interconnected these 
aspects of a liberal education are. A moral education, gained 
through moral teachings and the arts, is a necessary aspect of 
getting a liberal education simply for the fact that it's necessary to 
most properly learn rhetoric. The same is equally true of gaining an 
emotional education through music and poetry and the other arts, 
to be able to develop the pathos needed to better learn rhetoric. 
And all of this is just to master rhetoric! The bottom line is that a 
truly liberal education is a necessary foundation for the creation of 
a liberal society, including a liberal economy. Free markets require 
people of good character, with good empathy, and who are logical. 
Contemporary education hardly supports these aspects of 
education, and too often undermines them. 
McCloskey: At this I stood up and cheered! “Free markets 
requite people of good character.” So I said at length in The 
bourgeois virtues. 
Troy Camplin: I will note that liberal education must be rooted in 
grammar, logic, and rhetoric. (Not just these—I have mentioned the 
quadrivium, too—but I'm only going to discuss these three). If any 
are neglected, you do not and cannot have a liberal education. An 
education that excludes any of these will necessarily be an illiberal 
education and result in an illiberal culture and illiberal 
society. Many aspects of education today are postmodern, 
meaning exclusively rhetorical, meaning illiberal.  
McCloskey: I believe you are mistaken. It is not the 
rhetorical education, such as it is, that makes people illiberal—
as you yourself just argued a good rhetorical education can go 
the other way. And “postmodern” has nothing intrinsically 
illiberal in it. I myself am postmodern, and discuss the matter 
in some detail in Knowledge and persuasion in economics 
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(1994). I once argued (in a paper available I believe on my web 
site) that postmodern means simply anti-modernist, and the 
modernists are sons (mainly sons) of Plato, authoritarians 
who believe in One True Proof. 
Troy Camplin: Almost all of our problems with education, from 
the general lack of knowledge to the rise of the social justice 
warriors, can be traced to this fact. Grammar and logic are both 
actively neglected, indeed outright discouraged. I have taught 
composition classes, and I know. I have been told explicitly not to 
spend more than a week on either grammar or logic, and most of 
the composition classes I have taught have even been titled 
“Rhetoric.” 
McCloskey: Titled but not actually focused on vir bonus 
dicendi peritus. 
Troy Camplin: Grammar is of course more than just grammar in 
the narrow sense of the term, though is most certainly must include 
that as well. Stratford Caldecott in Beauty in the word argues that 
grammar also includes mythos and memory as well. Indeed, he 
points out that the ancient Greeks understood the arts as being 
products of the memory. We have to have an education founded in 
memory, in stories, in understanding the deep relations among 
things. With grammar, we see that each and every sentence is really 
a little story, and thus we understand the narrative structure of our 
thinking itself, insofar as that thinking is rooted in language. More, 
what are we remembering but tradition? Thus, tradition is tied in 
with grammar. Caldecott points out that a grammar education (and 
grammatical world view) is what dominated in the pre-
Enlightenment era. With the Renaissance and the rise of the 
Enlightenment, we moved toward a more logic-reason based 
education and world view. Logic, thinking, and knowledge are what 
came to dominate, with the resultant rise in science. Logic is 
unconnected with tradition, and an over-emphasis of logic can 
result in a rejection of tradition. Naturally, we need an education in 
logic, broadly understood, as it helps us better understand what is 
true (and to reject what in tradition is not true), but its over-
emphasis unbalanced us and resulted in a backlash. Rhetoric 
emphasizes persuasion and it is deeply connected to community. 
What will persuade people? What will foster community? While 
Aristotle argues you need logos, ethos, and pathos, if rhetoric 
becomes overly dominant, it is typically logos which suffers 
(especially if it is logic which is specifically what people are reacting 
against). And while stories are typically used to persuade and create 
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pathos, those stories are inevitably unconnected to tradition (or 
outright reject tradition). Ethos becomes emphasized over 
everything, which gets expressed in the postmodern world as 'I am 
good because I oppose racism and sexism and homophobia, so you 
should listen to me and do as I say.' While the first may be true (I 
think it is, anyway), the latter doesn't necessarily follow. More, it 
gets reversed such that people think that 'Because I am good, I am 
right,' meaning that if they are right then you are wrong, and if you 
are wrong then you are not good, and if you are not good you are 
racist, sexist, and homophobic. More, that ethos is based almost 
entirely on pathos, meaning how the person feels about something 
is what matters. This is where the social justice warriors come from. 
The danger is that we react against rhetoric in the same way and 
return to either a pure grammar or a pure logic. Indeed, there are 
some indications that we are returning to a more grammatical way 
of viewing the world with complex systems theory. The good news 
is that complex systems theory is also a logic based on that 
grammar, and it is a recognition of the necessary fact of community 
in all things as well. A recognition of deep structures fostering 
ecological rationality in the creation and maintenance of 
community at all levels of reality is precisely what systems theory, 
or spontaneous orders theory, is all about. To understand the world 
this way means we necessarily must start receiving a liberal 
education. A liberal education prepares us to understand the world 
as deeply complex, interactive, and interrelated. Each of the parts of 
liberal education contribute, but when they are individually 
emphasized at the expense of each other, education becomes deeply 
illiberal. Which is why education (and our societies) seems to swing 
between liberalism and various illiberalisms. Rarely do the three 
liberal language arts come together to reinforce each other, but 
when they do, we get a renaissance. Our current illiberal society is 
dominated by rhetoric. We need to reunite it with grammar and 
logic (and of course the other liberal arts) to rebuild our educational 
systems and renew our world. Now you may wonder if one can have 
a “mere rhetoric” without logic and grammar, and even without 
ethos, meaning all pathos. What else is Trumpian rhetoric? (One 
can point to others, but it’s a recent, obvious example.) 
McCloskey: Agreed. 
Day 2 
Troy Camplin: I also think we miss a lot of things in Plato by (1) 
assuming Socrates speaks for him (we make the same mistake 
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regarding Nietzsche and Zarathustra), and (2) failing to do a full 
literary analysis of his dialogues, paying close attention to the 
actions of the characters as well. One of these days I'm going to 
write a book on Plato's Phaedrus that lays out my understanding of 
the work that I expect a good two or three people to read. Indeed, 
Plato has Socrates distinguish between “true rhetoric” and “mere 
rhetoric” in at least one of the dialogues. 
McCloskey: My view is that to get deeply into Plato one must 
have Greek to a quite high level—which I for one do not. I 
remember a colleague in Philosophy at Iowa who taught Plato 
without having it, and I was always astonished that a serious 
academic would do so. But one relevant point about his Greek 
I do know. Plato was misled by the distinction in Attic Greek 
between the {certain, admired, actual} seeing-form of indirect 
discourse “I saw John going downtown” and the {merely, 
rhetorical, easy-to-dismiss} hearing-form “I heard that John 
is going downtown.” I believe—but have never troubled 
actually to find out by going through Plato’s Greek sentence-
by-sentence—that it led him to suppose there is an obvious 
distinction between truth and mere rhetoric, seeing and 
merely hearing. 
Troy Camplin: There is a great deal of research out there 
regarding the role of complex literature in increasing one's morals. 
It's less about the content than the complexity of the works, though 
I would tend to think that content has a role as well. The fact that 
one can point to exceptions to the rule (or, in some cases, seeming 
exceptions, as they do not agree without own morals at the present 
time) doesn't disprove the rule. Other factors can be in play as well 
in the formation of a person's soul. 
McCloskey: Do you know Wayne Booth’s The company we 
keep? Wayne cannot be doubted as an advocate for liberal 
education. Neither can I. But we know too many examples of 
amoral masters of “complex literature” to be so sure as you 
are that the “great deal of research” is conclusive. I was a 
graduate of the Summer School of Criticism and Theory in 
1988 when it was at Dartmouth, at the very height of the 
controversy over Paul de Man’s youthful fascism, for example. 
Troy Camplin: My issue isn't with rhetoric alone, but with 
rhetoric exclusively--or grammar exclusively or ethics exclusively, 
etc.--as creating an imbalance that pushes people toward 
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illiberalism. There is a rhetoric-only postmodernism that's very 
popular, and very illiberal.  
McCloskey: But there is in my neck of the woods also an 
anti-rhetoric-only modernism that is very popular and very 
illiberal, and all the worse because it handles the levers of 
power. Crazy professors of French are less of a threat, I think, 
than crazy professors of economics. Though crazy French 
professors of economics are perhaps most dangerous of all. 
Troy Camplin: There's also a morality-only postmodernism that 
has its own illiberal outcomes (one could view much critical theory 
and the hermeneutics of suspicion as morality-only 
postmodernism). I'm not a pure critic of postmodernism, but really 
a post-postmodernist who makes use of much that's good in 
postmodernism. I'm also a post-post-structuralist (a post-
structuralist structuralist). My concern is with an excessive focus on 
one or the other of the Trivium at the expense of the other three, 
and I'm pretty sure you agree that all three need to be in balance. 
McCloskey: Certainly, the trivium and indeed the 
quadrivium, too, in modern forms are just the ticket for a 
liberal education. But I repeat that liberal education does not 
have political implications, no entailments (to speak of logic; I 
am sounding here like my friend and former dean, Stanley 
Fish). What we do need for ethical development, if the child in 
question is not lacking the ethical synapses entirely, is wide 
experience combined with the intellectual tools to make 
something of it self-critically.  
Troy Camplin: Coincidentally, I consider Hayek to be 
fundamentally a post-structuralist and postmodernist, and I'm a 
huge fan of his work (and yours, of course—I can see The bourgeois 
virtues on the bookshelf from my computer at the moment). So 
don't mistake any criticism of some particular aspect of 
postmodernism as a blanket criticism of postmodernism! As for 
myself, I am a truths-as-strange-attractors post-postmodernist, 
seeing postmodernism as a needed corrective, but not the answer, 
either. Overall, for me the issues are exclusivity and imbalance. I 
wouldn't want a rhetoric-only education (which I see too often) or a 
morality-only education, or a grammar-only education, and I 
wouldn't want a rhetorical education focused only on ethos or 
pathos or logos, either. All need to be in balance. Sweet talk, yes, 
but it has to come from a sweet person as well—and make sense! 
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McCloskey: What you are describing is the ideal of General 
Education in a Free Society, in which the kids take rhetoric 
(in, say, English) and morality (which would surface in a good 
course in social science, but also in philosophical or religious 
ethics) and grammar (seen as a ruled system, thus 
mathematics, analytic philosophy, and especially elementary 
[that is, finished] physical science). 
Troy Camplin: Let me quote James Nichols (1998):  
While it is easy to denigrate the art of persuasion, most 
obviously by contrasting its possible deceptiveness with the 
truth of genuine knowledge, science, or philosophy, one 
should never forget the fundamental political fact that human 
beings must coordinate their activities with other human 
beings in order to live well, and the two most basic modes of 
such coordination are through persuasion and by force. 
One may note that during periods of high rhetoric, polities tended 
to be the most stable and freest, while in times when rhetoric 
degraded, it degraded along with the people's liberty as well. 
McCloskey: Thus the time after the Sicilian tyrants in which 
the study of rhetoric was invented in Greater Greece. But 
Nichols doesn’t grasp that “the truth of genuine knowledge, 
science or philosophy” is a will-o’-the-wisp. He needs to read 
more Kuhn (and Feyerabend), more James (and Rorty), and 
more Booth (and McCloskey).  
Philippe Chamy: I have renewed my deepest respects for rhetoric 
and the logos, thanks to your essay, for which I thank you. It seems 
to me that rhetoric, as it is practiced in court for example, accepts 
the idea, within certain established rules and limits, of 
manipulating or distorting reality consciously, for the sake of 
defending a client, for example. This is considered fair at court, 
even if it does involve a certain amount of exaggeration and 
minimization and even falsification, because there are lawyers on 
the other side to offer rebuttals, etc. and there is a judge and often a 
jury. Dialectics, on the other hand, seems to be really different in 
both form and function from rhetoric. It seems that if one is lucky 
enough to engage in dialectics proper, one is much freer in the 
sense that there is absolutely no concern for making sure certain 
facts are not discussed or hidden or distorted, or for any type of 
calculation of advantage in terms of use of language. This is because 
there is no pre-conceived or fully conscious, fixed objective, such as 
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the defense of a client, or persuading someone to participate in 
some action—to sell you a house at a certain price for example. 
Without a fixed objective rhetoric stops, or never begins. Its 
initiation or continuation would be pointless. In dialectics, 
however, it seems (or feels) that it is the dialectic itself which 
carries the practitioner to a destination unknown (consciously) 
even to himself or herself. The practitioner has no ulterior (final) 
motive, so (en route) is intellectually free compared to the 
rhetorician, even bound by the dialectic, on the other hand, as 
though it came from an outside force, such as a daimon. Put in 
another way, the dialectician is possessed by a question which 
haunts him or her and pushes and pushes curiosity to seek and 
keep seeking until he finds personal truth—the end result of a quest 
which I suppose is also the Truth with a capital T. I am not 
defending authoritarian Truth though, of course. It is in this sense 
that each person is assumed to have (even if it remains buried) a 
purpose or a truth. The dialectic, if successful, eventually leads to 
deliverance from the possession (which is why it requires midwives 
like Chris). This is my impression from my readings in any case, so 
I am inclined to think that the separation between dialectics and 
rhetoric is firmly grounded, while you (Deidre) seem to suggest 
perhaps the separation has become too wide. Or do you maintain 
that there should be a fusion of the two? Your additional comments 
would be most appreciated. Thanks again for your illuminating 
essay. 
McCloskey: Yours is an elegant defense of a distinction 
between persuasion and truth-seeking which I think has been 
overturned decisively since Kuhn and his masters and 
successors in the history, sociology, and even much of 
philosophy of science. Seminars in mathematics, to take an 
extreme example, are always and necessarily argumentative, 
taking a position that the four-color proposition has been 
proven, and defending it by the standard, which evolves (not 
always in a better direction). The original computer-assisted 
proof was controversial precisely because it used computers, a 
new form of argumentation in math. Again, I would cite the 
Blessed Booth: Modern dogma and the rhetoric of assent 
(1974). Or (to descend a level) McCloskey, Knowledge and 
persuasion in economics (1994).  
Winton Bates: Deirdre, I enjoyed reading your contribution. The 
only part I disagree with in it is your assessment of poor Socrates, 
who gave his life for the cause of free speech. That question has 
been raised already, so I will turn to another matter. 
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McCloskey: I had the great pleasure a couple of years ago of 
hearing a Greek actor perform the entire Apology (in English) 
in Athens, on the very spot, as near as could be determined, 
where according to Plato’s version it was first delivered!  
Socrates, again according to Plato (and not so much our other 
sources), defended discourse for sure. Whether a Greek could 
quite defend what we call free speech—for women? for 
slaves?—is not so certain. 
 Winton Bates: I agree that Adam Smith had a powerful 
argument in suggesting that the market is a form of persuasion. The 
point I want to raise relates to the ethics of how far we take such 
reasoning. How should we, as individuals, decide where to draw the 
line in using market valuations as a rhetorical device? The best way 
to illustrate what I am talking about is to quote from a lead article 
in a recent issue of the The Economist. The article, entitled ‘A grim 
calculus,’ discusses trade-offs between shutting down economies 
and saving lives posed by the coronavirus pandemic, but then 
suggests: “You can make a full accounting, using the age adjusted 
official value of each life saved. This suggests that attempting to 
mitigate the disease is worth $60,000 to each American household” 
(2020). The article goes on to argue that the cost of the shutdown is 
far outweighed by the value of lives saved. My initial reaction was to 
be glad that the “age-adjusted official value of each life saved” 
wasn’t estimated to be just $20,000. It is easy to endorse this kind 
of rhetoric when it supports one’s moral intuitions. On reflection, 
however, this kind of rhetoric, which balances the estimated 
monetary value of a human life against the cost of saving that life, is 
ethically suspect. Other people can exercise their right to engage in 
such rhetoric if they wish, but I refuse to join them. However, there 
is a dilemma. From a public policy perspective there is no avoiding 
trade-offs between lives saved and quality of lives of those who will 
have to pay to save them. It seems to me that it would be less 
offensive to construct arguments for or against shutdowns by 
making comparisons between different public policy decisions 
involving similar trade-offs. For example, it would be less offensive 
to be presented with a discussion of the opportunity costs implicit 
in public spending to save lives in similar medical circumstances in 
the past, or in preventing road deaths. You wrote in The bourgeois 
virtues about the immorality of the prudence only approach to 
economics that attempts to put monetary values on everything. I 
would be interested in your view of how such thinking should be 
applied to the rhetoric surrounding current public policy choices. 
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McCloskey: A lucid exposition of some of the issues. (I do 
not recommend The Economist, by the way, as economic 
education; it seldom gets beyond the conventional and is 
written by young smart alecks who know only the 
conventions.) A technical reply is that the value of life is not 
life-time earnings. My friend’s life is a public good, too, which 
is to say that I would put a value on it, too, perhaps larger 
even than she herself would put on it (her valuation inferred, 
say, from insurance purchased by her, or a risky occupation 
entered). I agree with you that within one realm—say this 
highway off-ramp compared with another design—the cost-
benefit calculus is sensible. I have written on “What Michael 
Sandel can’t buy: Review of Sandel’s What money can’t buy” 
in the Claremont Review of Books. A longer version of the 
piece is available at my website, as is a deeper exploration of 
the issues, “Saving Private Max U.” I come to liberal 
conclusions, namely, that the wisdom of social engineers such 
as economists is to be doubted. Not cast away, but doubted 
sometimes when applied too widely, as I think you do. 
Elizabeth Bissell: I enjoyed this chapter immensely. It was 
packed with logic, wit, and interest. 
McCloskey: Another person of taste! 
Day 3 
Winton Bates: Deirdre, thanks for the reference to your review of 
Sandel’s book. I have read the book and agree with your critical 
assessment of it. 
McCloskey: Sandel does not dig deep, which one would 
think a political philosopher should. He is satisfied, at least in 
this one book of his I have read (What money can’t buy), with 
the most superficial appeals to playground “fairness.” I hope 
he does better elsewhere. 
Troy Camplin: I've read a fair amount of Booth, and Stanley Fish 
would also agree that literature doesn't seem to make people more 
ethical—though they give mostly anecdotal evidence of it. The 
problem is that I think there's a danger of dehistoricizing and 
decontextualizing people when making these claims. For example, 
we find that many of the people in the humanities are Marxists. 
They are typically Marxists because they imagine "good people" are 
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Marxists, because Marxists care about the poor. The Frankfurt 
School and the Italian School Marxists tend to focus on culture and 
how to undermine contemporary culture to recreate the culture. 
Some interpret much of what they (and a number of postmodern 
thinkers) are doing as undermining values as such. 
McCloskey: Agreed (though “anecdote” is evidence, too). 
The Marxist (or at least marxoid) academy will not learn 
about economics or economic history beyond the usual 
suspects repeating the thoughts of The Master. People like 
David Harvey, whom in some ways I admire, construe all echt 
economics after the 1870s as merely bourgeois propaganda. 
This is an intellectual fault. 
Troy Camplin: The problem is that many of the "postmodern" 
leftists in the humanities close themselves off with their anti-value, 
anti-meaning, anti-responsibility, anti-truth deconstructed world 
view from such benefits as the humanities could bring them. We 
should not be surprised that such people are not exemplars of 
virtue, let alone wise. The Left, being generous with other people's 
money, but not their own, see theft as a virtue. These are, 
fundamentally, not good people.  
McCloskey: Thus in Chile, a leftist goes to a high-end 
restaurant and consumes a high-end meal, with very 
expensive wine. When the check comes, he starts shouting 
that those people over there, those capitalist running dogs, 
should pay, and walks out. It actually happened. The BBC 
tried to arrange a debate between me and Thomas Piketty, but 
Piketty would not do it. If such an event happens, I am going 
to inquire politely what he has done with his massive royalties 
from his books, which sit on coffee tables worldwide for virtue 
signaling. If it turns out he gave a good part of it to the poor, I 
will take him more seriously. I tithe in my church, giving 10% 
of my income to my Episcopal church to distribute 
competently (as I would not know how to do) to the actual 
poor. I am not a saint, just a normal Christian liberal. Part of 
the theory of hard Marxism is precisely that such acts merely 
prop up a corrupt system (the system that has increased the 
real income of the poorest of the poor in places like Japan and 
Finland, since their miseries of 1800, by about 3,000 
percent). 
Troy Camplin: But that is not necessarily the fault of the 
literature they are reading, or even of the humanities as such –- at 
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least, not all of the work being done in the humanities, anyway. At 
the same time, one could counter by simply asking whether or not 
most people who read a lot of literature are racists, sexists, 
homophobes, or any of a number of things we would consider 
immoral. If humans are naturally these things (with culture 
reinforcing them), it seems odd that so many in the humanities 
would reject racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. Yet what else does 
literature do but put us in the shoes of the Other? How many people 
in the humanities have read stories of people of different races, 
ethnicities, religions, beliefs, sexual orientations, genders, etc.? 
Through this empathetic entering-in of the Other through literature 
we are made more moral. 
McCloskey: I agree. Through reading of the Other in books 
Keats (n.d.) declared,  
Much have I traveled in the realms of gold 
And many goodly states and kingdoms seen.  
You will find conservatives railing against the flood of 
memoirs, which seem to embarrass them. But memoirs, like 
foreign travel and wide acquaintance, make us better, because 
more understanding of the Other. 
Philippe Chamy: Well, seems like the Dialectic has been 
dethroned in one fell swoop by a coup d’état (or Kuhnian 
Revolution) instigated by Rhetoric. So long beloved Holy Grail of 
Truth. Please ask dearest Deidre what we are supposed to do with 
those who claim to be the Masters of the Method to Truth because 
they are Masters of The Dialectic. Off with their heads? Is there not 
a single place at the table of the new paradigm of Rhetoric for 
them? 
McCloskey: I realize that you are angry about something I 
said, but I cannot quite grasp what it is. I have a long history 
of defending rhetoric, yes? The “dialectic” I don’t regard as an 
engine of Truth is Plato’s, after he fell in love with geometry, 
not the commodious sort of the title of the collective volume 
from which my essay came. It could also be called simply 
rhetoric, if the word were not so dirty in many people’s eyes. 
Chris Matthew Sciabarra: I don't want to speak for Deirdre 
McCloskey, but I think that in her exposition she's operating with a 
much narrower definition of "dialectic" here than is enunciated in 
the wider anthology. See here, for example: 
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http://www.differencebetween.net/language/the-difference-
between-rhetoric-and-dialectic/  
Her contrast between rhetoric and dialectic harks back to that 
representation. But when one looks at the larger point of her essay 
one sees that she is fully in keeping with the dialectical sensibility of 
this collection of essays. Note that her very proposition that 
"rhetoric and liberty are doubly linked" is itself a "dialectical" 
proposition in the way that this anthology defends: She is saying, in 
essence, that in the wider context rhetoric and liberty are 
reciprocally reinforcing factors in the creation and nourishing of 
free societies. 
  Moreover, the notion of "rhetoric" that Deirdre develops goes 
beyond that of the “unilateral process” of “persuasion” that is 
depicted in the ancient view. From where I sit, she is embracing a 
highly contextualized or "dialectical" view of "rhetoric" wherein the 
"give-and-take" of "persuasion" is echoed in both free speech and 
free trade, each a reciprocally reinforcing element of the other. She 
even compares this explicitly to the highly dialectical Habermasian 
notion of the “ideal speech community,” stating that, "Liberty 
depends on—indeed is the same as—Habermas’s ideal speech 
situation. Liberty has a rhetorical definition. It is why liberty of 
speech and liberty of expressions analogous to speech, such as 
offers of money or burnings of flags, are foundational” (2019, p. 
161). For McCloskey, “good rhetoric” is “a matter of establishing 
ethos and in other ways persuading each other to cooperate” 
nonviolently, akin to the dialogical give-and-take that is one aspect 
of how we see dialectics in this volume. 
McCloskey: Well said! 
Philippe Chamy: Chris Matthew Sciabarra, now is the time to 
bring out the big guns of Rhetoric against Deidre—your head is at 
stake! 
McCloskey: Huh? 
Chris Matthew Sciabarra: Philippe Chamy, not at all!  She came 
to this volume because she implicitly accepted its contextual 
foundations. That's why she's in the volume! I think my head will 
still be firmly attached in the aftermath of this discussion of her 
very worthwhile contribution!  
McCloskey: Yup. 
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Roger E. Bissell: First of all, Deirdre is an awesome writer. 
Stylistically, she's my favorite of the collection by a wide margin. 
(Sorry, guys; you're all wonderful, too, but she's magical!)  
Secondly, I agree with Chris that however a person *labels* what 
they refer to (as "dialectics," "logic," "rhetoric," "scientific method," 
"Socratic method," "dialogue," whatever) what matters most deeply 
- for this volume - is that a writer has a multi-faceted perspective 
and dogged pursuit of the truth rather than a narrow ideological 
bias that squeezes away inconvenient facts. On the formal side, we 
have distinguished between dialectics as a theoretical approach, 
dialectics as a set of particular techniques, and dialectics as one's 
actual methodological orientation and analytical approach of 
aggressively keeping the context of whatever one is investigating. 
This third aspect of dialectics as a discipline is dialectics as 
ACTUAL context-keeping, dialectical method IN ACTION. (None of 
this is the same as “the dialectic,” which is the unfolding of a 
process of conflict-resolution, tension-release, whether in an 
intellectual controversy or a social-economic-political conflict 
between two or more parties. Not to mention the further extension 
into biological or even physical processes of resistance-change. 
“The dialectic” is on the material side, the side of what is studied or 
critiqued rather than how. There's plenty of each to go around in 
the volume. All we hope is that people won't needlessly get 
confused as to which, if not both, is the main focus in a given 
chapter—and if both are involved, in what ways each is involved. 
When we get to my chapter, I'll address this issue again in my 
introductory remarks. But back to the “star of the show.” Deirdre is 
very adroit both at working from a dialectical orientation (of wide-
scope context-keeping) and at zeroing in on “the dialectic” as it 
unfolds in economic and social and political reality. And with the 
kind of rhetorical and stylistic panache I could only dream of 
wielding.) 
McCloskey: Again, well said!   
Philippe Chamy: To Roger Bissell I reply, Well, I tried to woo her 
to say something nice about dialectics; if you read me you must 
have seen that I left her many tenders. And, I got roundly and 
firmly rejected. She even persuaded me to reject myself. I did get 
"Elegant," of which I am extremely proud! But no place on her 
dance card nonetheless. Myself, I would be quite afraid of trying to 
foist the label of “dialectic” on someone who has shown in her own 
life a decidedly dogged determination to label herself, all by herself, 
without any mansplaining, and against all odds. But I wish you 
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luck. In the meantime, I am calling myself a rhetorician until and 
unless Madame Deidre says something nice about dialectics. 
McCloskey: I am still not getting your drift. And it’s OK to 
mention my gender change, but here I do not see its relevance. 
Roger E. Bissell: To Philippe Chamy I reply, I solidly concur with 
what Chris said above about Deirdre. He pointed out her arguing 
for a strong linkage between rhetoric and liberty. This is very 
similar to Ayn Rand's case for the deep tie between freedom of 
speech and economic and political freedom, and Chris has tagged 
this as clearly dialectical as well. And, for the Q.E.D. on this, Rand 
would not comfortably have accepted the label of “dialectical” for 
this (or any of her acute analyses) any more than Deirdre would. 
But as Chris notes, it is not what someone calls themselves or 
accepts as a label, but the sensibility and approach they bring to 
their subject that matters in the context of this volume. We are 
most fortunate and pleased to have Deirdre's (and everyone's) 
contributions to this exploration. And unlike Rand, who would 
surely have held the Sign of the Dollar in front of us to ward off our 
invitation to be part of the fun, Deirdre graciously accepted. Now, 
how about we discuss the actual contents of her essay, eh? This 
“meta” stuff is not going to go away soon, but in only four short 
days, Deirdre's chapter will. 
McCloskey: Ayn Rand worries me. She was decidedly 
uninterested in—indeed, fiercely hostile to—dialogue. Her 
epigones such as Murray Rothbard followed her lead in this.  
Philippe Chamy: In reply to Roger Bissell, The lady, or rather, in 
this case the man, . . . . 
McCloskey: Surely you’re not using the gender-change 
card?! This January 2020, I replied in a published letter to the 
editor to one Schmitz who had attacked my liberalism in a 
prominent essay in the constative Catholic magazine First 
Things. He insisted on calling me “he” throughout. Witty, eh? 
Philippe Chamy: . . . doth protest too much methinks. The 
essence of her essay is a defense of rhetoric against and in 
opposition to dialectics. Are we not discussing this? Or do we just 
pretend that this frontal and total attack did not really happen? If 
we minimize this attack on dialectics it seems we would be engaging 
in rhetoric. It would be highly disingenuous to then later insist that 
dialectics in fact never ignores the context. 
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McCloskey: I am still not getting it. Perhaps it is because in 
economics I face Platonists (Platonists unaware, of course) 
who are convinced that a “scientific method” they heard about 
in high school chemistry is a machine for arriving at Truth. 
That’s my complaint about an ancient conviction, initiated by 
Plato, that there is a Method analogous to geometric proof, 
which he called dialectic, and which many 17th-century 
enemies of rhetoric (Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, 
Newton) believed they were using. 
Roger E. Bissell: In reply to Philippe Chamy, We have already 
discussed it, at increasing length. But the essence of her essay is not 
an attack on dialectics. It is a DIALECTICALLY SENSITIVE 
argument for the deep linkage between rhetoric (free speech), 
capitalism (economic freedom) and political liberty. We are trying 
to get PAST labels here, if you would be so kind to acknowledge and 
engage accordingly. Your point is taken that there is a secondary 
labeling disagreement. As for the “the man doth protest too much,” 
I hope you're referring to me, otherwise we're going to have to call 
Security on this. 
McCloskey: Please, no muscle here! My motto is, If you can’t 
stand the heat, get out of the kitchen. 
Philippe Chamy: I reply to Roger Bissell, Deidre has not even 
answered my question yet and you already want me to shut up 
because “we have already discussed it at length.” That strikes me as 
rather authoritarian, and I am beginning to see more clearly why 
Deidre associates dialectics with authoritarianism. Well, my dear 
Roger, all you have to do is mansplain to Deidre—not me—that she 
is a dialectician unbeknownst to herself, like M. Jourdain, and get 
her to concede that this is really her True Identity, and I will not 
only concede, but will be in awe of your dialectical method. You will 
have earned the title of King of the Method to Truth. I tried to get 
her to say something nice about dialectics and failed. Your turn. 
Unlike Rand, she is far from dead and also unlike Rand she will 
willingly engage you. May the best wizard with the best method 
win! And also, just because you let her into the collection of essays 
does not mean she is not a Trojan horse. Caveat emptor. And good 
luck. 
McCloskey: I still do not know what is in what I said, or have 
said for nearly forty years now, that evokes such heat. (By the 
by, it’s DeiRdre. Without the R it is coded in Northern Ireland 
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(too small to be a country, too large to be an insane asylum) as 
Protestant.) 
Day 4 
Troy Camplin: Aristotle, in agreement with Plato, contrasts 
rhetoric and dialectics. Plato has Socrates argue that dialectics is 
personal and is what he practices in the agora, while rhetoric is 
what orators practice and is intended for a mass audience. From 
this perspective, this discussion comes closer to approaching 
dialectics as practiced by Socrates. A written essay or a written 
dialogue has more of a hybrid feel to it than does a speech intended 
for the public. It is public, in a sense, since anyone can read it, and 
yet the more one engages the text the more “conversational” it is. A 
well-researched text is also something of a dialogue, as one engages 
other thinkers, agreeing and disagreeing and expanding on their 
thoughts. And yet, it's also more like a speech, since you have an 
audience who isn't really able to ask you questions, but who are 
either going to be persuaded or not. 
McCloskey: Accepted, and a useful reminder, which I had 
forgotten. But Plato does appear to think that his logic 
chopping settles the issue. 
Troy Camplin: A Platonic dialogue is thus a synthesis of dialectics 
and rhetoric. This is something which Plato himself of course 
understood. And while dialectical thinking has itself evolved so that 
the single thinker, contemplating in his or her den or library, 
attempts to engage with as many perspectives as possible and to 
take in as full a context as possible, and finally to synthesize as 
much as possible, there is a lack of eloquence in the final product 
that Socrates claimed to have himself. Ironic as Socrates may have 
been, we only have to read a handful of contemporary scholarly 
essays to see how un-ironic that lack of eloquence has become 
among too many scholars. I, too, am guilty of this in my own 
scholarship—and without excuse! While I do tend toward a rhetoric 
of clarity when possible, I do not write as beautifully in my essays as 
I'm capable of writing.  
McCloskey: When I went from college to graduate school, I 
noticed my style sharply deteriorating, because in graduate 
school I was committed to truth—whereas as an undergrad I 
could merely be eloquent and get a good grade. 
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Troy Camplin: I acknowledge the proliferation of meanings in my 
poetry—interpretation should proliferate meanings in a poem's 
analysis—but the intention of dialectics is to discover the truth of 
things. Are these not in conflict? Perhaps not. If we understand that 
we can and cannot step into the same river twice, we can begin to 
understand that the proliferation of interpretations results in the 
creations of eddies, swirls around an absent center of truth we 
cannot ever realize but may perhaps be able to recognize as through 
a glass, darkly. No rhinoceros, for example, is or could ever be a 
perfect specimen. All actual rhinos only ever approximate the ideal 
rhinoceros—some are closer, some are father away from that ideal, 
whatever that may be, or could ever be understood to be. This 
inability to ever reach True Rhinocerosness, though, shouldn't 
imply there's no such thing as a rhinoceros! Each actual rhinoceros 
is but another step into the river, another swirl of being emerging 
and dissipating once again. 
McCloskey: The thought is Platonic, the ideal. And 
splendidly poetic. Wallace Stevens (n.d.) made a related point, 
though instead focusing (correctly I think) on the 
incommensurability of language and the real, instead of 
positing an idea to which language approximates:  
And when she sang, the sea, 
Whatever self it had, became the self 
That was her song, for she was the maker.  
(Stevens uses the word “maker” twice, and as classically 
educated knew well that “poet” comes from Greek for 
“maker.”)  
Troy Camplin: Which is true of physical objects like rhinos must 
surely be even more true of such “things” as freedom, justice, 
beauty, ethics and morality, and even truth itself. Each are 
contextual and historical and particular and universal 
simultaneously—particular instances creating a strange attractor, 
an absent center one can never reach, and which attracts and 
repulses simultaneously, the tensions necessary for their continued 
existence. A justice without the injustice and unfairness of mercy is 
an unjust justice, and we need to realize that it's the tension 
between justice and mercy which creates true fairness and allows us 
to live in a just world. 
McCloskey: You and Plato are what the medieval 
philosophers called “realists.” Realism is fine for practical 
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uses, though it does tend to be used as a weapon against 
harmless “relativists” like Stevens and Rorty and me. 
Troy Camplin: Equally, beauty is unity in variety and variety in 
unity (see Francis Hutcheson), and both are necessary for 
something to have beauty. That beauty—at which virtue aims—is a 
foundational aspect of freedom, justice, ethics and morality, truth—
and rhinoceroses! The dialectic seeks the unity; rhetoric seeks the 
variety; and yet, dialectic seeks to persuade each particular 
individual, while rhetoric seeks to persuade the masses. But 
humans are neither islands nor masses, but rather are socially 
constructed individuals always already social and thrown into a 
social context. How, then, can we not most forcibly persuade with a 
synthesis of rhetoric and dialectics? And how can we possibly reach 
truth when beauty is truth and truth, beauty—and we aren't writing 
the truths we seek to bring to light in the most beautiful ways 
possible? 
McCloskey: My ears perked up when you said, “Dialectic 
seeks the unity.” It is that tendency to “unity,” universal truth, 
that worries me, not because I do not believe in universal 
truths (here is a probable one: all even numbers are the sum 
of at least one pair of prime numbers), but because the 
universality is so routinely used as club to beat on people who 
believe that discourse should be open and friendly. I agree 
with your very useful point about a mass audience and a one-
person audience, a speech and a dialogue. But I do not see 
how anything persuasive can be un-rhetorical.  
Winton Bates: It is interesting that while Aristotle is searching for 
the truth about the topics he discusses, he is also engaging in an 
effective (soft sell) form of rhetoric. By recognizing different points 
of view at the outset, he seems to be more persuasive than he would 
be if he presented his own view without providing context. 
McCloskey: Spot on. The same is true of the Divine Doctor. 
Aquinas will say “Cicero says thus and such. The Philosopher 
[viz., Aristotle] says buzz buzz. I say NNNN.” 
Philippe Chamy: She refers to an actually historically existing 
canon of dialectics, which she rejects, and she does not reference 
any historically existing dialectical canon which she approves of 
specifically. Which historical dialectic (aside from your 
“commodious” one, which is not part of the canon yet) does she 
agree with? Agreeing to the label dialectician in your context does 
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not count (though clearly she is) because there is a wider world of 
scholars and writers in which she operates. I don't see that in any of 
her comments she has said anything at all in favor of dialectics. The 
question worth exploring is the reason why she prefers the label 
rhetoric. 
McCloskey: If you understand me to be saying that Plato 
claims to have a dialectic method that is to be contrasted with 
rhetoric—even though, as Winton Bates just correctly put it, a 
dialectic entails a rhetoric—then you will see why I don’t like 
it, as fake news about rhetoric. Socrates uses an elenchus, say. 
All right. Why is it not rhetoric? Of course it is talk meant to 
persuade, as all argumentative talk is, in this case by using a 
wrestling move to embarrass the opponent in the opinion of 
listeners, and maybe even to get the opponent to realize her 
error. 
Philippe Chamy: This is an important question and I feel we are 
sweeping it under the table in panic. I read Deirdre to say, in 
answer to my original defense of dialectics, that since Kuhn 
dialectics has been thoroughly discredited.  
McCloskey: Only if dialectics is understood as a dispositive 
method. I believe Plato thought it was, analogous to the 
geometry he loved, founding a “philosophy” which he 
contrasted again and again with the mere chatter of the 
marketplace and the democratic assemblies such as the 
Areopagus and the law courts. If dialectics is understood as 
serious, rigorous, thoughtful conversation, then I certainly 
have no objection to it at all, though observing that it is 
rhetorical, as all persuasion must be. Not dispositive. Not 
slam bang. Some things are, for the nonce, for instance the 
parallel postulate. Until in the 19th century in mathematics it 
was not. What is crucial is 
our ability to engage in continuous conversation, testing 
one another, discovering our hidden presuppositions, 
changing our minds because we have listened to the 
voices of our fellows. Lunatics also change their minds, 
but their minds change with the tides of the moon and not 
because they have listened, really listened, to their friends’ 
questions and objections. (Rorty, 1983, p. 562)  
If that’s dialectic, three cheers for it. 
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Philippe Chamy: In reply to Chris Sciabarra, I think Deirdre’s 
defense of rhetoric against the old dialectics, which is not your 
dialectics, Chris, is EXTREMELY worthy of exploring, and this 
exploration does not imply a rejection of your dialectics. I already 
knew that free speech is tied to a free economy. I DID NOT know 
there was an argument in favor of rhetoric as against the dialectic, 
so for me this is fascinating. Interminable chants like mantras 
about context keeping and the value of dialectics in general are the 
dead horse for me. But I will keep my peace.  
Chris Matthew Sciabarra: Philippe, Deirdre noted that she was 
aiming SPECIFICALLY at a Platonic version of dialectic, which is 
not what we have laid out in the introduction to the book. I agree 
with Troy that Aristotle, too, contrasted dialectic and rhetoric, but 
Aristotle saw rhetoric as “an offshoot of dialectic ... a branch of 
dialectic and similar to it.” For him, “Rhetoric may be defined as the 
faculty of observing in any given case the available means of 
persuasion. This is not a function of any other art.” It is crucial to 
the mode of exposition. It is an aspect of dialectical method that 
takes into account the interests and concerns of the audience 
(Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.2.1355b27-28, 1.2.1356a25). And I don't think 
we're engaging in chanting a mantra here; you'd be surprised just 
how poisonous context-dropping is to social inquiry. It is rampant 
throughout the social sciences, in some instances, proudly adhered 
to in the name of “specialization.”  
McCloskey: Yes. I am an economist by training, carefully 
trained to ignore and disdain politics, sociology, literature, 
philosophy, history, anthropology, and anything else what 
would disturb the narrow “dialectics” of an economics 
violating the sweet and learned practice of its founder, the 
Blessed Adam Smith. 
Chris Matthew Sciabarra: And it has led to terribly one-sided, 
one-dimensional defenses (and attacks) on human freedom, which 
is, of course, precisely what the contributors to this volume are 
exploring...contextually. Every contributor to this collection comes 
to it from their own specific context. But they would not have joined 
in as contributors if they were not comfortable being placed within 
the Big Tent that The dialectics of liberty constitutes. How anyone 
defines themselves (be it Troy as a dialectical materialist or Deirdre 
as a rhetorician, etc.) helps us to grasp where they might be coming 
from in the larger “canon” that we have described as “dialectical.” 
Each brings their own “take” to the centrality of dialectical method 
in the defense of liberty. Ultimately, every contributor accepts the 
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central premise of the volume: That our understanding, defense, 
and nourishment of human freedom depends upon the larger 
context in which it is embedded. In essence: *CONTEXT 
MATTERS*. The volume unites all the contributors on this 
essential, distinguishing characteristic at the heart of a dialectical 
"sensibility." I truly, honestly, and sincerely do not know what else 
to say on this topic or how many other ways to say it. 
McCloskey: I say. Hurrah! 
Philippe Chamy: Chris Matthew Sciabarra, I think that being a 
good rhetorician and a polite person, Deirdre will never directly 
reject your version of dialectics. Being true to herself, though, she 
rejects the label as it is used everywhere else except here. My 
original comment to her was to get her to point out at least 
something about dialectics which she accepts. I was surprised to 
have gotten what I read to be a total rejection. Specifically, since she 
said that since Kuhn dialectics is discredited. However, I think that 
deep down she is against all dialectics and rejects all versions of it 
even as she makes an exception out of love for you. I agree with 
context keeping, your work and the work of the contributors is very 
important, I agree with that too. I repeat from an edit above in case 
you missed it: I already knew that free speech is tied to a free 
economy since I read Rand; I did not need to wait for Deirdre to tell 
that to me. I did not know there was an argument in favor of 
rhetoric as against the dialectic, so for me this is fascinating. I 
honestly and sincerely think she is inviting us to relabel ourselves. 
Too bad it's treated as a hot potato. 
McCloskey: I am puzzled that about this we are so wound up 
and apparently wounded, too. (Is there anything more insane 
than English spelling of vowels?) Surely it is an 
uncontroversial point—yes, after Kuhn—that science is 
rhetorical. We tried in the conference in the early 1980s at 
Iowa that eventuated in the Red Book on The Rhetoric of the 
Human Sciences (McCloskey et al., 1987) to get Kuhn to 
admit that he was a rhetorician. He wouldn’t bite. A few years 
later we gathered to Iowa the Strong Programme gang in the 
sociology of science, mainly British, and tried it on them, too. 
No dice. But I suppose these is no one here who denies that 
science and scholarship and marriage and sports talk and 
faculty meetings are rhetorical. 
Chris Matthew Sciabarra: Philippe Chamy, you are wrong 
about Deirdre. Sorry, friend. I had extensive phone conversations 
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and email correspondence with her, in which we went through 
many of her essays to come up with a piece that she would expand 
on for the purposes of this volume because she found great value in 
its central thrust. She was fully committed to this project and its 
theme. We had no relationship or interaction prior to this 
anthology. The love grew out of our interactions working toward a 
common goal. She certainly didn't need our volume to make a name 
for herself; if anything, we were honored that she accepted our 
invitation and graced our anthology with such an eloquent essay. 
But at no point did I ever believe that she was simply being polite in 
contributing to the volume. At no point has she ever expressed any 
rejection of this anthology's dialectical core—whatever her 
criticisms have been of other approaches to dialectic. 
McCloskey: My mother certainly taught me to be polite. 
(She, at fully 97 years of age, is listening to NPR upstairs right 
now in my sister’s house in Bloomington, IN, where during 
the plague I occupy the basement.) But she also taught me to 
tell forthrightly the truth as I saw it, which has gotten her and 
me into trouble all our years. The truth is I fully support the 
idea of a contextual dialectic. 
Philippe Chamy: Chris Matthew Sciabarra, to be clear, I fully 
understand that Deirdre is a dialectician as you define it and that 
she values your work and this work. Out of love is meant in the 
sense, for the love of this project. 
McCloskey: Well, both. Amor omnes vincit. 
Kent Rainey Biler: I just finished catching up, and this chapter 
was my favorite so far. Isn't the false dichotomy of Dialectics as 
opposed to Rhetoric a form of Dualism and not Dialectical Inquiry 
itself? I would think they're not necessarily opposed, but 
interdependent and intertwined. For instance, the rhetoric of Chris 
Matthew Sciabarra convinced me that Dialectical Inquiry was worth 
its weight in gold, and I in turn convinced my Marxist friend Joshua 
Rector that it's indeed applicable to Libertarianism. I don't believe 
that Ms. McCloskey is opposed to Dialectical Inquiry per se, just 
that she understands the importance of persuasion. As for 
addressing McCloskey directly: Ms. McCloskey (can I call you Aunt 
Deirdre?). 
McCloskey: I am honored. 
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Kent Rainey Biler: My friend has this saying that he considers an 
“Iron Law.” It goes like this: “A perfectly crafted argument is no 
different than a gun to the head.” Obviously, this chapter deals with 
what constitutes coercion, so I'm just wondering how exactly you'd 
respond to such a statement? 
McCloskey: Your friend is deeply mistaken, and you must in 
friendship exercise all your rhetorical skills to get him to 
realize how terribly childish, ignorant, authoritarian such a 
notion is. Once sweet persuasion is defined as coercion, 
coercion is made OK. Remember the Anti-fa woman a few 
years ago calling on the men to come over and expel a 
journalist from their rally: “We need some muscle over here.” 
It’s like talking about “verbal rape;” it devalues the horror of 
actual, physical rape. Consult Booth, Now don’t try to reason 
with me, or some pages of mine in Why liberalism works 
(2019). We need a word for real, physical coercion. That your 
friend is merely embarrassed that he can’t actually find an 
argument against, say, Milton Friedman does not mean that 
Milton (the mensch) was coercing anyone. 
Chris Matthew Sciabarra: I would agree completely that it is a 
false dichotomy if interpreted in the way: “Aunt” Deirdre uses 
“rhetoric” and the way I and my co-editors (and many of our 
contributors) use “dialectic.” And I would go further. I would say 
that the kind of Platonist “dialectic” that Deirdre criticizes is the 
same kind of “dialectic” that I criticize in the first chapter of “Total 
Freedom,” which as she says is very much rooted in the “synoptic” 
tradition of Plato. 
McCloskey: Agreed. 
Day 5 
Troy Camplin: I suppose one could ask the question of any 
relativist: relative to what? Even the physical example I gave of 
rhinos posits each actual rhino is a relativistic realization of an 
absent center that cannot itself ever be actually realized. How 
“realist” is something that is inherently unable to exist? 
McCloskey: So I guess you are not an enthusiast for the Idea 
of a rhino? Welcome to nominalism, namely, as Humpty 
Dumpty said, that we are the masters, that is all. I recur to 
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Wallace Stevens’ “The Idea [note] of Order [which we impose] 
at Key West” (n.d.).  
Ramon Fernandez, tell me, if you know,  
. . . tell why the glassy lights,   
The lights in the fishing boats at anchor there, . . .   
Mastered the night and portioned out the sea, . . .  
Arranging, deepening, enchanting night.  
Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon,  
The maker’s rage to order words of the sea.  
Our rage.   
Troy Camplin: I posit, too, that everything is always changing 
and in movement (one can and cannot step into the same river 
twice—Heraclitus). Everything changes relative to everything else. 
There's no solid ground, but only ever-shifting sands over which 
there are ever-flowing streams. Rhinos as a kind of animal emerge 
as an eddy in the stream and will one day disappear. That's hardly 
universal—but it can have a degree of durability, of duration that is 
not insignificant. Here in the cosmos, there is nothing that is 
eternally, universally true; rather, we find everything to have 
different degrees of duration—even the laws of physics.  
McCloskey: It is the little word “is” that does the work here 
(shades of Bill Clinton). Listen to the physicist Niels Bohr in 
1927: “It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find 
out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about 
nature.” We. Say. With words. About categories involving 
philosophical and ethical analysis. The German poet Rose 
Ausländer (n.d.) wrote,  
In the beginning 
was the word 
and the word was with God 
And God gave us the word 
and we lived in the word.  
And the word is our dream  
and the dream is our life.  
We dream of categories, in our metaphors and stories, and 
with them we make our lives, especially our scientific lives. It’s 
ethical acting. The good person skilled at speaking. 
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Troy Camplin: But from our human duration, that's long enough 
and true enough. From our limited human understanding, though, 
it can all be overturned tomorrow as we come to different 
understandings (overturned? perhaps more accurately, turned into 
special cases). Regardless, we continue to find certain patterns of 
behavior emerging at different levels of complexity, and I suspect 
that the cosmos is better understood than known—the poets 
understand just as much, but in a different way, from the scientists 
(especially when those poets are internally-externally consistent 
and truly want for everyone what they truly want for themselves). 
McCloskey: On Easter Sunday (Christ has risen indeed. 
Halleluiah!) I of course agree that “poets” (makers of words, 
such as the New Testament) “understand just as much,” or 
more. Again, Wayne Booth, who said once that a possible 
answer to the question What is the Life of Man is, “A babe was 
born in Bethlehem.” This from a lapsed Mormon. 
Troy Camplin: What, then, does the scientist do? Try to 
understand things of sufficient duration that those things create 
patterns in the cosmos, including the human noosphere. Shifts in 
understanding create shifts in focus and meaning and value, which 
never actually fully overturn the past, adding instead layer upon 
layer upon layer, beautifying and complexifying our understanding. 
Is this "realism"? Is this "relativism"? I suspect that the realist 
would accuse me of relativism just as the relativist accuses me of 
realism. Both, simultaneously, is an option. What's what we makers 
of meaning do. 
McCloskey: But your talk of increasing the layers, you will 
agree, is the conventional talk of physical scientists of little 
philosophical or rhetorical sophistication. And they certainly 
think of themselves as realists. Yet I accept, and largely agree 
with, your pragmatic position. 
Troy Camplin: I think Plato is getting a bit of a bad rap when it 
comes to his position on rhetoric. It's a much more complex 
position than many give him credit for having. For example, if we 
take Plato's Phaedrus (which I have taught several times in several 
rhetoric classes), we see Socrates criticizing a piece of rhetoric 
presented to him by Phaedrus, which Phaedrus is praising as being 
a wonderful example of the art. (Coincidentally, the structure of 
Plato's Phaedrus seems to parallel that of Euripides's Hippolytus 
[whose stepmother's name is Phaedra], and there may be 
something in the meaning of Plato's dialogue we can garner from 
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that fact.) Yet, what is presented is rather dull and uninspiring. It's 
actually a terrible piece of rhetoric! Socrates then makes the same 
argument, but much more beautifully and persuasively. He then 
flips it and makes the opposite argument, just as beautifully and 
persuasively. Then, he goes on to argue that his argument for and 
against love are in fact the same argument! Part of the problem 
with the original piece of rhetoric is that it's not particularly 
persuasive. It's not really all that well-written, and it's uninspired. 
(It is lacking in spirit—a spirit which fills Socrates in order to create 
his own arguments.) Where's the passion? Where's the enthusiasm 
(being filled with the gods)? It's nowhere in the original piece, and 
those elements are why it fails as a piece of rhetoric. What Plato 
criticizes in Phaedrus is poor rhetoric, not rhetoric per se. Poor 
rhetoric doesn't actually convince anyone, or only convinces a 
person long enough for someone else to come along and present at 
least just as weak an argument. Shall we all just flow with the wind? 
Or should we at least try to reach some kind of understanding about 
ourselves and others, about what makes us virtuous people among 
other people within our cultures and societies? Does it matter 
whether or not we should love the lover, or not love the lover? (Or, 
as Socrates suggests in suggesting both arguments are the same 
argument, are things more complex than that?) 
McCloskey: Oh, I don’t think there is any question that Plato 
despised rhetoric, along with all the other practices of 
democracy, and claimed that he was devising a Method 
(philosophy, dialectic, geometry and all the other precursors 
of, say, modern logical positivism, and modernism more 
widely). That Plato was himself a better rhetorician than 
Phaedrus (in the dialogue which I, too, have taught many 
times, with John Nelson in Political Science at Iowa, and with 
John Lyne of Pitt when he was at Iowa) is merely a case of 
Cicero’s joke that Plato was a great rhetorician in attacking 
rhetoric. Plato’s brilliantly persuasive appeals to a mythos 
(which he attacked when Homer was doing it), such as the 
parable to the cave, points the joke. 
Jason Walker: I will only add this much: My study of Plato has 
convinced me that almost everything he puts in the mouth of 
Socrates should be taken with a grain of salt, in that he uses a lot of 
dramatic irony with his dialogues, and it's not uncommon to find 
Socrates contradicting himself from one dialogue to another. In this 
instance, Gorgias is kind of a funny dialogue, in that while Socrates 
lambasts rhetoric, he uses it himself, just as in other dialogues, he 
rejects poetry while being poetic, and rejects myth and storytelling 
 
McCloskey et al. 32  Poroi 15,2 (May 2020) 
 
just before telling elaborate stories about how the afterlife is 
supposed to work. I get the impression that Socrates, if he were 
alive today, would be the kind of guy who'd perform a rock ballad 
warning listeners about the dangers of rock music to the youth, and 
just after shredding through a guitar solo complain bitterly that 
guitar solos undermine any artistic value to rock. 
McCloskey: Yes, which is why Plato has such a hold on our 
imagination down to the present. Alfred North Whitehead 
noted that all of us, if philosophically inclined at all, are 
merely footnotes to Plato. The hold is especially tight among 
the more sophisticated (note the word) among us. Such 
people, being playful foxes rather than somber hedgehogs, 
delight in the trope of tropes, irony. I recently wrote an essay 
on the economist Joseph Schumpeter in which I noted his 
heavy use of irony to protect himself from criticism, taking 
both sides simultaneously, which disarms anyone who takes 
one side. It’s a way of being witty, and he uses it massively. 
Another case is an old essay by the economist Robert Solow 
on so-called “production functions” (I discuss it in The 
rhetoric of economics). Solow announces at the outset that he 
believes both that they exist and that they don’t. Ha, ha. How 
can anyone resist such charm? 
Chris Matthew Sciabarra: Synoptic versus Contextual Unity. 
This is a two-part point addressing a very important point raised by 
Deirdre with regard to the dangers of so-called “dialectical” unity 
when it is viewed through what I have called a “strict organicist” or 
“synoptic” lens. In my contribution to the volume I distinguished 
among strict atomism, dualism, monism, and strict organicism. I 
have argued that the Platonist view of dialectic was marred by strict 
organicist (or synoptic) premises—for which I believe Aristotle 
corrected in his own magisterial presentations of dialectical method 
in Topics and elsewhere, arguing not for a ‘synoptic’ unity, but for 
an understanding of the larger context by a continuous variation of 
one’s “point of view” on any issue under consideration. And yet, the 
strict organicist understanding of ‘unity’ has, throughout 
intellectual history, often contaminated approaches that had 
legitimate dialectical elements as I have defined them: the 
emphasis on grasping the ‘whole’ through its constituent parts and 
their relationships among one another, made transparent by 
varying our vantage points and the levels of generality on which 
they are viewed, both systemically and dynamically, and so forth). 
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McCloskey: Yes, for example in biology one can view life 
from a strictly microbiological viewpoint, or from the cellular 
viewpoint that has been so dogmatically asserted since DNA, 
or from the whole organism, or from the ecology in which 
organisms float. In economics, what Chris is calling “strict 
organicist understanding” causes economists to demand that 
everyone should think only of individual behavior and add it 
up, rather than thinking of the whole market, say. I am 
writing a book that will appear from the University of Chicago 
Press in the fall of 2021 attacking such dogmatisms, which 
one finds for example in the fashion for “behavioral” 
economics.  
Chris Matthew Sciabarra: All of this reminds me of a discussion 
in Total freedom prompted by a very important issue raised by one 
of our members, Lester Hunt (who has been very supportive not 
only of my work but especially of The dialectics of liberty, for which 
he has provided a wonderful endorsement on the back cover). I will 
just cut and paste the relevant sections of “TF” to illustrate the very 
real problems with ‘organicist’ (or 'synoptic') unity in contrast to 
‘contextual’ unity, the first certainly lending itself to the kind of 
authoritarianism that Deirdre—and, I suspect, most of us—find 
abhorrent:  
Somewhat less surprising is the anti-collectivist stance of such 
individualists as Rose Wilder Lane and Ayn Rand, both of 
whom railed against strict organicism. Lane rejected the 
"beelike" view of "human society as an organism," for "[i]n the 
human world, there is no entity but the individual person." 
Rand repudiated all attempts to reify the concept of "society," 
which cannot be viewed "apart from its members." For Rand, 
"'society' ... is not a separate, mystical entity .... You cannot 
claim that you have a healthy forest composed of rotting trees. 
I'm afraid that collectivists cannot see the trees for the forest." 
But Rand also lamented the "[t]he rapid epistemological 
degeneration of our present age---when men are being 
brought down to the level of concrete-bound animals who are 
incapable of perceiving abstractions, when men are taught 
that they must look at trees, but never at forests. (Sciabarra, 
2000, pp. 164-66)  
It is ironic that Rand the individualist was herself criticized by some 
for having projected a kind of strict organicism in her evaluation of 
people who belonged to her so-called Inner Circle. Rothbard 
satirized the Rand “cult" in his one-act "morality play,” “Mozart 
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Was a Red.” He depicts the cult leader as somebody who could 
allegedly grasp a person's inner life by an assessment of their 
musical tastes. “Your taste reveals your musical premises," says the 
cult leader, "[b]ut the system of premises interconnect, on a deeper, 
and therefore on a more important level.” Rothbard gives 
humorous form to what Lester Hunt has identified as “the problem 
with the totality.” Like Walker, who indicts Rand's cultic “totalism,” 
Hunt suggests that “the habit of seeing everything as connected 
with everything else ... would tend to give [us] other habits, ones 
that tend to be very unfriendly to liberty.” Since Hunt believes that 
this problem might be endemic to "dialectical" thinking, he is worth 
quoting at length: 
Suppose I notice that you have made a mistake of some sort. 
To the extent that I have the habit of thinking in totalistic 
terms, I am apt to think there is a great deal more wrong with 
you than this one mistake. This will be true whether the 
mistake is moral, aesthetic, or philosophical, whether you are 
attracted to a person I find unworthy, or do not adequately 
appreciate the music of Rachmaninoff, or have wrong views 
on the problem of free will. At the very least, you are ignorant 
of the logical import of all the truths that support the idea you 
have rejected or the virtue you have failed to show. Worse yet, 
if I expect your thinking to constitute an organic whole, then I 
will suspect that your error will bring with it many other ideas, 
ones that must also be faulty somehow. On such a view, there 
will not be many small mistakes, and harmless ones will be far 
between. But in that case, people who appear to me to make 
mistakes—that is, people who disagree with me---will be ones 
that I find unwelcome and undesirable. If this is true, then I 
am that much less likely to show the virtues of civility and 
tolerance. But these virtues are an essential part of a free 
society, because they require me to act in such a way that I 
leave others free from irrational pressure to subject their way 
of thinking to mine. (Sciabarra, 2000, pp. 164-66) 
McCloskey: This is all very good stuff. It explains why when 
we disagree with each other, as I did most strongly with my 
sister Laura this very morning about the basic integrity of 
George Bush II (I took his side, despite his disastrous errors in 
Iraq), we tend to suppose that there is some deeper fault in 
the other person. In science and scholarship, if Professor A 
disagrees with Professor B, she will therefore be inclined to 
suspect deep evil in B and will stop talking to him. Why talk to 
Hitler? Thus Nancy MacLean in History at Duke wrote a 
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disgracefully calumniating and unscholarly book about the 
economist James Buchanan, and now refuses to speak to 
anyone who criticizes her, because such people are obviously 
“conservative” (they are not) or “racists” (they are not, though 
she accused Buchanan of being one, in part because he came 
from Tennessee), and anyway such evil people teach at 
universities that the Koch Foundation has supported (e.g. 
Duke). 
Chris Matthew Sciabarra: Synoptic versus Contextual Unity 
(Part Two): 
If we inferred something about the totality of a person's 
character from the vantage point of a single aspect (for 
instance, a person's like or dislike of Rachmaninoff), this 
inference would be an instance of context-dropping. It would 
amount to the reification of a single aesthetic response as a 
whole unto itself, not merely one moment of a complex 
totality. In order to evaluate the meaning of such an aesthetic 
response, one would have to know a lot more about the 
context of the responder, about those experiential, emotional, 
psychological, and social factors that influence the formation 
of a person's sense of life over time. That sense of life, so 
important to aesthetic response, as Rand herself says, is 
deeply personal. Attempts to elevate one's aesthetic 
judgments to the level of dogma and to use them as guides by 
which to evaluate other peoples' characters can only create a 
stultifying, authoritarian environment. So Hunt is correct; 
totalism is not friendly to liberty or tolerance or civility. But 
"the problem with the totality" is only a problem when viewed 
in strict organicist [or synoptic] terms. There is no "problem 
with the totality" in dialectics. The totality must be viewed 
contextually, for that is the only *human* way of 
understanding it. (Sciabarra, 2000, p. 166)  
McCloskey: A splendid line of thought. The “aesthetic” word 
is correct. In a novel, for example, the writer has to line up the 
characters as consistent wholes just to keep the thing from 
becoming a confusing jumble. But people are inconsistent, 
and often the most consistent along us, such as Lenin, say, are 
properly viewed as monsters. George Orwell noted that the 
Hindu-saintly Gandhi was willing on three occasions to let his 
family face starvation rather than eat meat. Orwell was 
arguing against saints. St. Catherine of Siena starved herself 
to death at the age she supposed Jesus died by confining her 
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eating to the host. (McCloskey, D. N. (2006). Humility and 
truth. Anglican Theological Review, 88(2), 181-96. Surely you 
subscribe.) 
Chris Matthew Sciabarra: I make an additional point with 
regard to Karl Popper’s own critique of the synoptic canvas cleaning 
of the social engineers who acts as the "artist [who] clamors, like 
Archimedes, for a place outside the . . . world on which he can take 
his stands” (Sciabarra, 2000, p. 94). But the world always continues 
to function, even as the artist tries to remake it. I cite another one of 
our contributors and members, my friend Dave Prychitko on this 
point, who argues in a Popperian-Hayekian vein 
... that we cannot ‘break with the whole of tradition’ or ‘leap 
outside time and history.’ He highlights Gadamer's lesson, 
that ‘[w]e can question everything ... but not all at once .... As 
opposed to critical scrutiny from some exterior, utopian 
position, our task must be “based on immanent criticism,” as 
Hayek so characterized it. (Sciabarra, 2000, p. 94 n. 18) 
McCloskey: Gadamer’s remark reminds me of the remaking 
while under sail of wooden warships, which always had plenty 
of carpenter’s mates and the spare parts for them to work, an 
image used also by Otto Neurath of the Vienna Circle, and 
called “Neurath’s Ship.” You can’t rebuild the whole ship all at 
once, but you can erect a new mast or permanently plug a 
gash in the side, ending up in effect with an entire rebuilding. 
Chris Matthew Sciabarra: Hunt warns that if such totalistic 
thinking is something entailed in dialectics then dialectics may be 
inimical to liberty. In this regard, Hunt's critique mirrors Popper's 
view that the emphasis on totality is the methodological moment of 
political totalitarianism. The critiques of Rothbard, Walker, Hunt, 
and Popper are more accurately leveled against strict organicism 
than against dialectics. The confusion is not unusual, for, as the 
history of dialectics shows, thinkers such as Plato and Hegel 
internalized a tension between totalism and contextuality. Theirs is 
a struggle between a longing for the divine and a human need for 
comprehensiveness, a struggle that well illustrates the distinction 
between strict organicism and dialectics. 
McCloskey: Bravo! 
Troy Camplin: Is there only a single set of conditions under 
which one will come to prefer Rachmaninoff over Mozart, or vice 
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versa? That seems unlikely. We know that we can have two 
superficially similar systems with quite different underlying 
architectures. Different experiences can give rise to the same 
outcomes. One of my favorite anecdotes that occurred to me 
personally and involved an interaction between me and the poet-
philosopher Frederick Turner, under whom I took classes on poetry 
writing and on beauty and who was on my dissertation committee. I 
had had him in the class on beauty, so the two of us had gotten to 
know each other and our world views. In fact, our world views are 
very similar, from aesthetic tastes to our support for free markets to 
our religious Omnism and our Darwinianism. In the poetry writing 
class I had with him, he started the class by asking us to share our 
backgrounds. To begin, let me share Turner's background. This is 
an important thing to understand for the anecdote. Frederick 
Turner is Scottish and is the son of the famous anthropologist 
Victor Turner, meaning Fred grew up in Africa for many years. His 
parents were Marxist atheists, but later converted to Catholicism. 
Fred's brother helped invent the MRI. Fred has been nominated for 
the Nobel Prize for literature several times for his sci-fi epic poems. 
He has the equivalent of a Ph.D. in literature from Oxford. So when 
Fred asked us to share our backgrounds, this is what I said: 
I was born in South Bend, IN, but grew up in rural Kentucky. 
My father was a coal miner with an 8th grade education and 
my mother was mostly a housewife, with a high school 
education. I was raised in a fundamentalist Baptist church, 
but I majored in recombinant gene technology at Western 
Kentucky University. After getting bored with biology while 
working on my Master's, I dropped out and took 
undergraduate English classes in preparation for a Master's in 
English, which I got at the University of Southern Mississippi.  
I was at the time working on my Ph.D., so naturally I didn't need 
to mention that, which was in progress. So when I finished with my 
background, Fred leaned up over the table and said, "How on 
EARTH did the two of us come to the same conclusions?!?" We 
came to the same mental states because different pathways can lead 
to the same outcomes. That's a fact of complex systems. Fred came 
to the same conclusions about free markets as I did, though he 
came from a background of Marxist atheist scientists while I came 
from a background of fundamentalist Baptist coal miners. Now, if 
two people from such diverse backgrounds can practically share an 
entire world view, surely there are more than a few pathways to get 
one to Rachmaninoff. 
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McCloskey: What a wonderful and illuminating story! 
(Second cousins of mine [once or twice removed], by the way, 
built Gary, and stayed to work in the mills.) As I said, humans 
are “inconsistent,” if that means “not following, say, a Marxist 
theory that class position determines thought.” 
Roger E. Bissell: Here is my final benedictive comment on 
Deirdre's chapter, which I enjoyed very much: One of the most 
satisfying things about it was her clarifying explanations of some of 
the things liberty is NOT. Imagine if Chris, Ed, and I had titled our 
volume, “The dialectics of being rich and powerful” (Dahl and 
Lindblom). Or “The dialectics of rotating democratic rule” 
(Aristotle). Or, my personal favorite, “The dialectics of not having 
to cope with the persuasive power of the vigorous arguments of 
others” (too many anti-libertarian types to mention). It would have 
been a far different book—far less worthy and far less promoting of 
genuine human political freedom—if we and our authors had 
embraced any of these false idols. The other thing, near and dear to 
my heart, is the theme of her chapter, persuasion/rhetoric as the 
link between free speech and a free economy. This says it all, “Free 
speech is more than merely parallel to free exchange” (McCloskey, 
2019, p. 150). Indeed. It is the communication channel for free 
exchange, whether of ideas or of material goods and services. 
Libertarians, Objectivists, and others have long been adept at 
exposing the false alternative (even 50 years ago only very roughly 
definitive of “liberals” and “conservatives”) between civil liberties 
and economic liberty and showing how they are inextricably linked. 
Deirdre is a formidable expositor of the true alternative: freedom 
(voluntary interaction, persuasion) vs. force. 
McCloskey: Thank you, Roger. (And for the word 
“benedictive.”) I am working now on a paper connecting free 
will as understood philosophically and theologically with, 
again, free markets. And thank you all very much for getting 
me back into my beloved rhetorical studies. I regret not going 
to Alta anymore (Is it still going?)   
McCloskey: Yes.  
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